Risk Management in the NHS: Governance, Finance

and Clinical Risk by Fenn, Paul & Egan, Tom
© Royal College of Physicians, 2012. All rights reserved. 25
■ THE FUTURE OF THE NHS Clinical Medicine 2012, Vol 12, No 1: 25–8
Introduction
Health services are inherently risky: their core activities involve a
response to unpredictable events where the potential for loss
(both financial and non-financial) is high. Moreover, the
responses themselves have uncertain consequences when things
go wrong, and healthcare providers need to be aware of the risks
they face in order to manage them in the interests of both patients
and staff. Risk management has been defined as the systematic
identification, assessment and evaluation of risk.1 Used properly
in healthcare, it can not only be a process to report incidents, but
also minimise the harm that clinical or resourcing errors can
cause to patients and staff. From this perspective, the risk man-
ager’s remit in the NHS covers a wide range of activities – from
the assessment and identification of risks through financial risk-
transfer measures to investment in the quality of clinical care and
beyond. The practice of risk management has developed and
widened considerably in the NHS in the last decade in response to
several key reports including An organisation with a memory,2
which highlighted the need to learn from clinical error, and
Standards for better health, which outlined potential improve-
ments to the quality of care across several dimensions.3
Moreover, risk management can be considered as part of the
broader area of clinical governance which is defined by
Chandraharan and Arulkumaran as a ‘framework through
which NHS organisations are accountable for continuously
improving the quality of their services and safeguarding high
standards of care by creating an environment in which excel-
lence in clinical care will flourish’.4 Risk management encom-
passes many aspects of clinical governance, from risk reporting
(and response to complaints) to audit, guidelines, risk assess-
ments (risk registers) and training.1 In 2009, the Audit
Commission recommended that trusts should ‘review their risk
management arrangements – including the way in which risks
are reported to the board’ and that the Department of Health as
well as Monitor (the regulator of foundation trusts (FTs))
should ‘consider further incentives and sanctions to reward
good governance through greater autonomy and take action to
address shortfalls where they arise’.5
This paper explores this theme – the inter-relationship
between good governance, financial incentives and clinical risk
management – and provides an overview of recent develop-
ments together with some evidence gleaned from views
expressed by key decision takers within the NHS. Firstly, rating
systems used within the NHS to classify hospitals according to
the quality of their risk management activities are reviewed.
Risk ratings in the NHS
NHSLA risk management standards
A risk management programme was introduced by the NHS
Litigation Authority (NHSLA) in 1995, although it was 2000
before it was fully implemented. The core of this programme is
provided by a range of NHSLA standards and assessments, and
it is a requirement of continued membership of the Clinical
Negligence Scheme for Trusts (CNST) that hospitals are subject
to audit by the NHSLA. A set of risk management standards for
each type of healthcare organisation was developed incorpo-
rating organisational, clinical, and health and safety risks
(www.nhsla.com).
All the NHSLA standards are divided into three ‘levels’. NHS
organisations which achieve success at level one in the rele-
vant standards receive a 10% discount on their CNST contri-
butions, with discounts of 20% and 30% available to those
passing to levels two and three respectively. Members of the
CNST scheme are required to achieve level one compliance
and are assessed on an annual basis until this is achieved.
Organisations at level one are assessed against the relevant
standard(s) once every two years and those at levels two and
three at least once in any three-year period, although organi-
sations may request an earlier assessment if they wish to move
up a level. The discount earned by members is applied to con-
tributions in the financial year following a successful assess-
ment and is valid for two years. Organisations which fail an
assessment are required to be assessed at the level assigned in
the following financial year.
Monitor’s governance risk ratings
Monitor uses the term governance to describe the effectiveness
of an NHS FT’s leadership. It uses performance measures, such
as whether FTs are meeting national targets and standards (eg a
reduction in methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)
rates), together with a range of other governance measures such
as community representation, appropriate board roles and
structures, clinical quality and service performance. Specifically,
it requires evidence that boards address and resolve any risks
that have been identified. Trusts are rated red (significant breach
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of terms of authorisation), amber-red (material concerns),
amber-green (limited concerns) or green (no concerns).
Monitor’s financial risk ratings
When assessing financial risk, Monitor’s ratings reflect the like-
lihood of an actual or potential financial breach of the FT’s
terms of authorisation. The ratings are based on four criteria:
achievement of financial plan, underlying performance, finan-
cial efficiency, and liquidity. Financial risk ratings are allocated
using a scorecard which compares key financial information
across all FTs. A rating of five reflects the lowest level of financial
risk and a rating of one the greatest.
If an NHS FT has failed to comply with the terms of its autho-
risation and this is significant – for example, if it consistently
fails to meet required standards of care or is at significant finan-
cial risk – Monitor’s board may decide to use its statutory
powers of intervention. These range from closing a specific ser-
vice, to removing any or all of the directors or governors and
appointing replacements.
The risk manager’s perspective
To get a better appreciation of how risk management operates in
NHS trusts, the views of nine acute NHS trust risk managers
were obtained via exploratory telephone interviews in 2010 and
2011. Eight of the nine trusts selected had recently achieved an
increase in their CNST risk management level.
The main findings to emerge from these interviews were as
follows:
• All trusts which achieved a risk management level increase
claimed to have done so as part of a planned strategy – while
this was mainly the responsibility of the risk management
staff, other stakeholders, such as the board of directors and
clinical staff, were also engaged.
• The declared motivations for seeking a risk management
level increase involved both reputational and financial
issues. From a reputational perspective, trusts see patient
safety and quality benefits from obtaining higher risk man-
agement levels ‘...the push for level two was about reputation
and how we looked as a trust’; ‘It was a priority at board level
to get to level three … to demonstrate that the trust’s safety
and quality agenda was in place and was embedded across
the trust’. From a financial perspective, as discussed above,
the NHSLA provides discounts on a trust’s CNST contribu-
tion in return for the achievement of higher risk manage-
ment levels and such discounts act as an incentive, as evi-
dence by one interviewee: ‘there also was the financial incen-
tive – the 10% discount on the premium was substantial and
this came at a time when financial pressures were starting to
be considered’.
• Financial strength is seen as being important in order to
obtain risk management level increases. Trusts that are in a
position to commit financial resources to assist with an
NHSLA assessment typically will do so, and find such invest-
ments to be more than justified if a successful outcome is
obtained. Making such an investment is not felt to be a pre-
requisite to obtaining a risk management level increase but
there is a general consensus that financially strong trusts are
in a better position to do so as they have more resources to
enable them to make such financial investments.
• Trusts with good governance structures believed that they
were more likely to obtain risk management level increases.
Eight of the nine trusts had recently increased their risk
management level while all had recently acquired FT status.
These tended to go hand in hand: one interviewee felt that
trusts had to demonstrate good risk management arrange-
ments as part of the process when applying for FT status,
while another felt that a positive outcome of acquiring FT
status was that it gave trusts a ‘good governance structure
which helped when applying for risk management level
increases’.
• The governance structures in place as a result of acquiring
FT status are said to be enhancing the risk management
function within trusts. The new structures in FTs include
public interest governors, staff governors and representation
from the trust board. While such arrangements have taken
time to settle down, they now ‘work quite well and both
public and staff governors are willing to support quality ini-
tiatives such as the patient experience’. From a financial per-
spective, FTs are also granted financial freedoms such as the
ability to raise capital from both the public and private sec-
tors within borrowing limits determined by projected cash
flows – this is said to enhance the ability to invest in risk
management level improvements.
In summary, the consensus of the views obtained from our
interviews with risk managers implied that there are definite
relationships between governance structures, financial health
and risk management activities – trusts typically have a plethora
of external organisations to deal with on an annual basis and
improvements made in governance relationships (as evidenced
by acquiring FT status) are typically accompanied by improve-
ments in a trust’s financial position, and this improved financial
health is an enabler to help them improve their risk manage-
ment practices.
The interdependence between governance, finance
and risk management 
From the views expressed by hospital risk managers, there would
seem to be a strong a priori expectation that hospitals with good
governance would perform well in relation to the management
of clinical risks. Well run hospitals should have in place the
structures to enable sound decisions about the allocation of
resources, including those concerned with investment in patient
safety measures. Moreover, hospitals with sound finances are
expected to be best placed to manage clinical risk well; clearly,
concerns about financial risks would be expected to constrain
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management in pursuing clinical risk management opportuni-
ties which require additional resources.
To confirm whether this expectation was borne out by the evi-
dence, the extent to which the ratings described above were cor-
related with each other were explored. The following tables show
the results obtained by comparing the ratings given to 137 foun-
dation hospitals as at 30 June 2011, including the CNST risk
management levels as assessed by the NHSLA and current at
that date.
Tables 1 and 2 show the relationship between the CNST risk
management levels and Monitor’s finance and governance risk
ratings respectively. Surprisingly, there appears to be little corre-
lation between these, and this is confirmed by the Chi-squared
tests reported at the foot of each table. By contrast, Table 3 shows
a significant relationship between Monitor’s ratings for financial
and governance risk. It seems that Monitor’s separate assess-
ments of hospitals’ exposure to risk is correlated, but bears little
relationship to the quality of clinical risk management measures
as audited by the NHSLA.
Part of the explanation for this conundrum may lie with the
way that the NHSLA incentivises hospital managers to improve
their risk management levels. Discounts of up to 30% on the
CNST contributions are available for hospitals assessed at the
highest level. This could conceivably lead to mixed conse-
quences: hospitals with good governance and low financial risk
may feel that the extra expense involved in acquiring higher
standards is justified, but on the other hand hospitals facing
financial problems could also feel that the contribution dis-
counts are a way of easing those problems. So the relationship
between governance, finance and clinical risk may be a complex
one.
To illustrate this, as part of a programme of research funded
by the ESRC on public services quality, several studies exploring
the link between the financial incentives for improved risk man-
agement and the responses by NHS hospitals were recently con-
ducted. In one study, no relationship between the utilisation of
diagnostic imaging tests and the risk management level attained
was found.6 However, in another a positive relationship between
higher risk management levels and a lowering of the hospital’s
MRSA infection rate was found.7 It has been speculated that cer-
tain types of patient care activity, including the use of diagnostic
tests ordered by individual clinicians, may be less responsive to
risk management incentives placed at the level of the hospital,
whereas others, such as hospital infection control policies, are
much more amenable to financial incentives at that level.
Conclusion
In this paper the reasons why good hospital governance and
sound finances are expected to be conducive to improved clin-
ical risk management processes and outcomes have been set out.
These expectations were shared by those risk managers inter-
viewed in NHS hospitals – they clearly believed that there was a
causal connection between their governance structures, the
quality of their financial risk management, and the NHSLA’s
assessment of their clinical risk management standards. In prac-
tice, the current evidence from FTs does not bear this out, at
least in the strict sense of a correlation between measurements
of risk management standards across these categories. Why
should this be so? There are a number of possible explanations.
The measurement of risk management standards by Monitor
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and/or the NHSLA may be flawed, or the measurement may be
accurate but the expected relationships are not there – they
could be based on rhetoric not reality. Alternatively, the notion
of risk management is something far more complex than can be
captured by a single number for each hospital. Complex organ-
isations can suffer from considerable inefficiencies, not least in
terms of communications and internal incentives. Harris
addresses such points explicitly to hospitals. He argues that the
hospital is ‘two firms in one’: a medical staff and an administra-
tion, each with ‘its own objectives, decision variables, and con-
straints’.8 Attempts to incentivise one of these groups to the
exclusion of the other may end in failure. This problem is not a
new one, but the widening remit of risk management in NHS
hospitals does beg the question: whose risk is being managed?
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